I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person rst price auction with a liated signals. I show that when the game is symmetric there is a unique Nash equilibrium that satis es a regularity condition requiring that the equilibrium strategies bepiecewise monotone. Moreover, when the signals are discrete-valued, the equilibrium is unique. The central part of the proof consists of showing that at any regular equilibrium the bidders' strategies must be monotone increasing within the support of winning bids. The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in twoperson rst price auctions. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions.
Introduction
Much of the literature on auctions focuses on symmetric equilibria in which the buyers' bids increase monotonically in the signals they observe. For symmetric rst price auctions there is only one symmetric equilibrium in monotone strategies, but it is not yet fully understood whether there may be other equilibria that do not satisfy symmetry and monotonicity. There are a few authors who address the question of uniqueness but only in very speci c environments. For instance, Griesmer, Levitan and Shubik 2] provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium set of a two-person rst price auction in which the bidders' private valuations are independently and uniformly distributed. More recently, Maskin and Riley 9] establish uniqueness for the independent private values model with symmetric bidders and provide partial extensions for asymmetric versions of that model. However, a general treatment of environments that involve common values and correlated signals is still missing. Maskin 
and Riley 7] constitutes a rst
This paper is part of the second chapter of my Ph.D thesis. step in tackling this problem. For the case of a two-person symmetric auction with a liated signals, that paper shows that the symmetric equilibrium is the only equilibrium in monotone strategies.
Ruling out the possibility that there are other equilibria in non-monotone strategies remains as the main hurdle to solving the problem of uniqueness in the two-person case. I do this here. Speci cally, I examine this problem in the context of a sealed bid rst price auction with a liated signals. Aside from the restriction to two players, the environment that I consider is rather general, encompassing the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber 12] a s w ell as the model of Maskin and Riley 7] as particular cases.
The main ndings are the following. I show that at any Nash equilibrium that satis es a regularity condition, both bidders' strategies must actually bemonotone increasing within the support of bids that can win with positive probability (winning bids). The regularity condition requires that the equilibrium strategies employed by the bidders be piecewise monotone. Using this result, it then follows that there is a unique equilibrium when the game is symmetric. Moreover, when signals are discrete-valued every equilibrium is regular so there must be a unique equilibrium in this case as well.
Most of the paper is devoted to show that the equilibrium strategies must be monotone increasing. Importantly, this result extends to asymmetric auctions. The argument is rather elaborate and relies heavily on the assumption of a liation. I brie y sketch the main issues involved.
To examine the problem of bidder 1, x bidder 2's strategy and two bids b 0 and b 1 To study the best reply of bidder 1 to the strategy 2 of bidder 2, we need to gain insight about the way 1 (b 1 s 1 ) ; 1 (b 0 s 1 ) varies with s 1 . The two arguments of h 1 re ect two di erent aspects of the information revealed by the signal s 1 . The rst argument re ects direct information about the expected value of the object. Given the monotonic structure introduced in the problem by the assumption of a liation, this expected value increases with s 1 : Thus, 1 is nondecreasing in s 1 and, therefore, h 1 is non-decreasing in its rst argument. The second argument o f h 1 re ects information about both the expected value of the object and player 2's bidding behavior, which is revealed by s 1 indirectly through its statistical linkage with s 2 .
To understand this second e ect I rely on the following property of a liated random variables. I say that the map ' : < ! < is quasi sign-monotone (QSM ) if '(y) 0 ) '(y 0 ) 0 for almost every y 0 > y:The map ' is weakly QSM if '(y) > 0 ) '(y 0 ) 0 for almost every y 0 > y. Suppose that x and y are a liated random variables. Then, if ' is weakly QSM, E('(y) j x = x) is QSM.
Let b denote the upper lower boundof the support of winning bids. A key property is that 1 is QSM in its second argument as long as the restriction of the inverse bidding strategy to b b ] is monotone increasing. Combining these observations we are able to conclude that h 1 is QSM in its second argument. Taking into account both arguments of h 1 we reach the conclusion that if the restriction of the inverse bidding strategy to (b b 0 ] is monotone increasing, then 1 The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I lay out the model and introduce the basic notation. In section 3 I derive some basic results about the support of the equilibrium distribution of bids. In section 4 I derive the key consequences of the assumption that the signals are a liated. Section 4 contains the main monotonicity result and section 5 applies this result to establish uniqueness in the symmetric case. Section 6 is devoted to concluding remarks. Most of the proofs are contained in the appendix.
The Model

Description and Basic Assumptions
In this section I lay out the model of a sealed bid rst price auction. There are two bidders who submit their bids simultaneously and a single object is awarded to the highest bidder as long as his bid is at least as large as a reserve price r: In case of a tie, the winner is selected randomly. Moreover, the price paid by t h e winner equals his own bid.
The problem is modeled as a two-person Bayesian game. Throughout the paper I refer to the players as bidder i or bidder j making the convention that i j = 1 2 and that i 6 = j. Each p l a yer selects his bid after privately observing the value of a signal. Let s i denote the signal observed by bidder i (where I adopt the convention of using bold case letters for random variables). This signal takes values in a set S i < which I suppose to beeither a closed interval or a nite set. Let F : S 1 S 2 ! 0 1] denote the joint distribution of the players' signals.
I suppose that F has a density function f with support S 1 S 2 (in the discrete case, f denotes the density with respect to the counting measure): Moreover, I assume that the signals are a liated. In general, the components of a random vector are a liated if any t wo non-decreasing functions of the random vector are positively correlated conditional on every sublattice of the support of the joint distribution. In particular, random variables whose distribution has a density are a liated if and only if the probability density function is Monotone Totally Positive of Order 2 (M T P 2 )(Karlin and Rinott 5], Milgrom and Weber 12] 
Additional Notation
Here I de ne the players' strategies and several concepts of monotonicity and local monotonicity that will be useful in the analysis. Moreover, I introduce additional notation that will be used throughout the paper.
Let B denote the Borel -algebra associated to < + and let P(B) denote the set of probability measures on B . A behavior strategy for bidder i is a mapping i : S i ! P(B) such that, for each B 2 B, the application < i B > is a measurable function from S i to the interval 0 1] : The mapping~ i : S i ! < is a selection Applying the preceding de nitions to our strategy space, I de ne the following concepts. I say that the strategy i is monotone non-decreasing (increasing) if the set of the selections~ i from i such that~ i is not monotone non-decreasing (increasing) is a set of probability measure zero (according to the probability measure induced by i ). Moreover, I say that i is monotone at b (quasi-monotone at b) if the set of selections~ i from i such that~ i ; b is not SM (QSM) at b is a s e t of probability measure zero.
The following notation will be used throughout the paper. Suppose that bidder j employs the strategy j . Given j , let Q i (b s j ) denote the probability that bidder i obtains the object provided that he bids b and that bidder j's signal is s j . Also This section reviews some properties of the support of the equilibrium bidding distributions that do not directly depend on the assumption that the signals are a liated. In essence, I rule out the possibility of gaps and, in some sense, mass points in the interior of the support of winning bids. Since most of the arguments are already standard, I will only discuss the results brie y. Nonetheless, detailed proofs are supplied in the appendix for completeness. The rst observation is that none of the bidders ever selects a winning bid at which his expected payo exhibits a jump discontinuity. Since this kind of discontinuity can only occur because the other bidder's strategy has a mass point, the tie-breaker makes the expected payo of the player in question an average of the right and left limits of his expected payo at the point of discontinuity. But then he can improve b y either bidding a little more or a little less. Thus, we can state the following: Finally, note that when a bidder's strategy is quasi-monotone and presents a mass point at a bid b, the "types" of this player that bid b are larger than the ones that bid less than b. Since the other bidder can increase his payo by increasing slightly his bid to "capture" these higher types, his payo jumps discontinuously at b. Thus, he never bids in some interval (b ; 
Consequences of A liation
Given the strategy of the other bidder, the e ect on a bidder's expected payo of a c hange in his bid only depends on the value of his signal. Clearly, the nature of this dependence is critical in the analysis of the shape of the equilibrium strategies that we undertake in the next section. Here I investigate how that dependence is a ected by the assumption that the signals are a liated.
For the remainder of this section I x the strategy j of bidder j in order to examine the best response by bidder i. (1) where the inequality is a consequence of assumption A 3 . Thus, assumption A 2 and the fact that Q i (b 1 s j ) ; Q i (b 0 s j ) 0 imply that i is non-decreasing in its rst argument, and that it is strictly increasing when the preceding inequality is strict. Thus, if bidder i's probability of obtaining the object is strictly larger when he bids b 1 than when he bids b 0 as it will bein the relevant cases, h i will bestrictly increasing in the rst argument.
Examination of the dependence of i on s 2 is somewhat more intricate. Suppose that the restriction of bidder j's inverse bidding strategy to the interval b j b 0 ) is monotone increasing. Since this implies that j is monotone at b 0 , Lemma 4 implies that it is also atomless at b 0 : Clearly, there must exist a signal The consequence of Lemma 5(i) is straightforward: h i is non-decreasing in its rst argument, and it is strictly increasing whenever bidder i's probability o f obtaining the object is strictly larger when he bids b 1 than when he bids b 0 : In fact, it can beshown that h i is SSM in its rst argument.
When the signals are independent h i is constant in its second argument. However, statistical dependence between signals establishes a probabilistic linkage between the signal observed by a bidder and the bids selected by the other bidder, which also a ects the rst bidder's expected payo . In fact, the analysis of the dependence of h i on its second argument constitutes a more subtle problem whose structure depends crucially on the assumption that the signals are a liated. To study this e ect I rely on the following property of M T P 2 transformations (related results appear in Karlin 4] We conclude directly from Lemma 5(ii) and Lemma 6 that h i is QSM in its second argument. Combining this with the fact that h i is SSM in its rst argument, we establish the following. 
Monotonicity of the Equilibrium Strategies
In this section I show that the equilibrium strategies are monotone increasing within the support of winning bids as long as the equilibrium satis es the following regularity condition. De nition 2 I say that the strategy i is regular if almost every selection~ i from i is a piecewise monotone function. A regular equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which both bidders employ regular strategies. 
Final Remarks
The monotonicity result derived in this paper provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person rst price auctions. At least in the twoperson case the assumption of a liation provides su cient structure to ensure a very general monotonicity result, which is independent of any symmetry considerations and of the bidders' attitudes toward risk. Combining this result with earlier work by Maskin and Riley, I also establish a uniqueness result for the two-person symmetric case.
The two main limitations of the results reported here are related to our focus on regular equilibria of two-person auctions. The restriction to regular equilibria is of a technical nature but may n o t besuch a demanding requirement from the economic point of view. Moreover, it is not restrictive at all when the signals are discrete valued. The second quali cation is of a more fundamental nature and, in fact, our results can beconsidered only a preliminary step in the analysis of the n-person case. However, the extension of the methods used here to the general case does not seem to be straightforward. In particular, Lemma 6 does not generalize to the n-dimensional case. The following counterexample establishes this point. Consider a probability measure p de ned on the set of the 3-tuples (i j k) such that i j k 2 f0 1g. Let p ijk denote the probability of the element (i j k) and let p ij (k) denote the conditional probability that the rst two elements take v alues i and j given the fact that the third one takes the value k. Suppose that p 00 (0) = p 01 (0) = 1=3 p 10 (0) = p 11 (0) = 1=6 p 00 (1) = 4=15, p 01 (1) = 4=10 p 10 (1) = 2=15 and p 11 (1) = 2=10. De ne a function ' on such that '(i j k) = ' ij . It can be easily veri ed that p is M T P 2 and that ' is a weakly QSM mapping. Finally, notice that E(' j k = 0) = 0 and that E(' j k = 1 ) = ;0:06: Thus Proof of Lemma 6. Since ' is weakly QSM, there must bea parameter value s 0 j 2 S j such t h a t '(s j )(s j ;s 0 j ) 0 for almost every s j 2 S j . Given x x 0 2 S i such that x < x 0 , denote ( s) = f j (s j j x 0 )=f j (s 0 j j x 0 ) ; f j (s j j x)=f j (s 0 j j x) where f j denotes the density of the conditional distribution of s j with respect to s i . I claim that '(s j ) (s j ) 0 for almost every s j 2 S j : Note that when s j < s 0 j we have that (s j ) 0 because f is M T P 2 and that '(s j ) 0 because ' is weakly QSM. Similarly, (s j ) 0 and '(s j ) 0 when s j > s 0 j . The claim follows. Finally, note that (x 0 )=f j (s 0 j j x 0 ) ; (x) =f j (s 0 j j x) = Since j is quasi-monotone at b, the lemma follows trivially if j is atomless at b. Consider the case in which j has a mass point at b: Since in this case b is a winning bid for i and j is quasi-monotone at b, Lemma We conclude that the type s of bidder i bids b with probability 1 . Part (ii) follows. 2
